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BEYOND PARALYSIS: THE RE-FRAMING OF ISRAELI PEACE ACTIVISM SINCE THE SECOND 
INTIFADA 
by Leonie Fleischmann 
 
ABSTRACT 
This article looks at the transformation of Israeli peace activism since the second Intifada. It 
does this by focusing on the collective action frames of Israeli peace activism, using framing 
processes from social movement theory to identify and explain shifts in the ideas and beliefs 
surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It argues that, contrary to conventional wisdom, 
Israeli peace activism did not reach a ‘dead-end point’ following the second Intifada but 
instead took on a new trajectory. While the moderate component of Israeli peace activism 
may have become paralyzed, unable and unwilling to respond to the prevailing realities, the 
radical and alternative components continued to act, transforming their ideas and presenting 
new ways to challenge the conflict. This article suggests that although these groups have not 
had an impact in the policy arena, their influence comes in the realm of norm 
entrepreneurship and therefore their efforts should not be overlooked. 
 
Within the vast scholarly literature on Israeli peace activism a conventional perspective 
prevails in which the movement was “paralyzed” in the wake of the second Intifada 
(Palestinian uprising).
 1
 Unable and unwilling to respond to the outbreak of violence from the 
Palestinians and Israel’s response to the uprising, the argument holds, the Israeli peace 
movement became politically irrelevant, particularly with its acceptance of the unilateral 
2005 Disengagement Plan, and all significant peace activities came to a halt. Tamar 
Hermann’s influential study The Israeli Peace Movement: A Shattered Dream is one of many 
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that mark the definitive endpoint of all Israeli peacemaking activity at the conclusion of the 
Second Intifada. She asserts, 
 
 “…the bitter disappointment with the political chaos and accelerating violence that followed 
Israel’s disengagement from the Gaza Strip and the later electoral victory of Hamas in early 
2006, led to a complete halt of peace activism in Israel. Not even the...Second Lebanon War 
in the summer of 2006...nor the Annapolis peace initiative of late 2007, were successful in 
revitalizing the movement, which is admittedly a historical remnant today and no longer a 
relevant political actuality.”2
Similar studies cite exhaustion and disillusionment, alongside peace activists’ 
inability to form a coherent agenda in response to the outbreaks of violence in this period, as 
indications of the decline of the Israeli peace movement. These accounts characterize “the 
most prominent peace activists” as “silent and disillusioned,” inertly “retir[ing] to the 
seclusion of their homes.”3 While these scholars are right in arguing that Israeli peace 
activism has been in decline since the second Intifada and that activists have been unable to 
revitalize activities to a level comparable to the 1980s and 1990s, this decline has only been 
evident amongst some, as opposed to all, of the activist groups.  
This is confirmed through my three-fold typology of Israeli peace activism. Three 
components of Israeli peace activism can be identified through the ways in which they frame 
the conflict, a “moderate component”, a “radical component” and an “alternative 
component”. Such typologies have a strong precedent in the study of peace movements and 
both Hermann and Kaminer use the terms “radical” and “moderate” to describe different 
parts of the Israeli peace movement.
4
 Groups within the moderate component frame the 
conflict through a liberal Zionist lens, which seeks peace for the sake of the continuity and 
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security of Israel. The paralysis and decline of the Israeli peace movement only refers to these 
such groups. Groups within the radical component, which tend to focus on the Palestinian 
narrative of suffering under Israeli military occupation, and the alternative component, which 
try to balance these two positions, often with a specific human rights frame, have continued 
to mobilize. Existing groups, such as Gush Shalom (Peace Bloc) and B’Tselem (The Israeli 
Information Centre for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories), alongside emerging 
organizations, are a voice that calls for alternative peacebuilding strategies and are the 
catalysts for challenging the political status quo. The more radical Israeli peace activists and 
their movements, despite their relative invisibility within the scholarly literature, are far from 
“paralyzed.”5 Israeli peace activism is in a state of flux since the breakdown of the Camp 
David talks and outbreak of the second Intifada in 2000 and so the demarcations into the 
different components may not be strict; some organizations may display characteristics that 
cross over into the different components and individual activists may perceive themselves as 
more ‘radical’ or more ‘moderate’ than the groups they operate within however, key trends in 
the collective action frames can be identified that enable this typology. 
Even among the emerging studies that give attention to some of the groups within the 
radical and alternative components that have emerged since the second Intifada, such as 
Anarchistim Neged haGader (Anarchists Against the Wall) and Machsom Watch (Check 
Point Watch), there is a greater focus on the exogenous factors that affect a peace 
movement.
6
 Hermann, for example, uses a framework built around political opportunity 
structures and public opinion to analyze the peace movement from 1993 to 2008.
7
  This leads 
her to read the marginality of these radical groups within Israeli society as the indicator of 
political irrelevancy that marks the “dead end point” of the Israeli peace movement. While 
these groups have been unable to influence policy change, there is much more to the political 
landscape that demands consideration. Scholars’ tendency to focus on the external factors 
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that affected Israeli peace activism and to narrowly contextualize it within the Oslo peace 
process obscures significant internal features.  These restrictive frameworks have kept those 
groups, formulating different ideas surrounding the conflict, outside the scope of scholarly 
analysis, which has inhibited a full accounting of the impact that these groups have had and 
are having beyond the policy arena—particularly in the realm of norm entrepreneurship, 
which refers to the changes that people can make to social norms on which, according to 
Sunstein, social conditions are dependent.
8
 Unearthing the details that allow for an 
understanding of the relationship between the different components of Israeli peace activism 
requires the clear identification of framing processes, which highlight the meaning work 
behind enduring grassroots Israeli peacebuilding efforts. 
In a study of Israeli peace activism from the first Intifada, Reuven Kaminer argues 
that the radical groups were the agenda setters. While Shalom Achshav (Peace Now), the 
largest of the moderate groups, was able to mobilize mass demonstrations, such as 50,000 to 
80,000 people in January 1988 against the Government’s response to the first Intifada, 
Kaminer emphasizes that it was the pressure of the “small wheel of the bicycle” (the radical 
component) that pushed the “big wheel” (the moderate component) to take certain positions 
and mobilize sooner than they would have otherwise.
9
 Ideas that originated in the radical 
component, such as recognition that the Palestinian Liberation Organization was the true 
representative of the Palestinian people, diffused into the moderate component of Israeli 
peace activism and, eventually, into later government policy, highlighting norm 
entrepreneurship in practice.
10
 In the period beginning with the second Intifada, however, the 
“big wheel/little wheel” dynamic no longer held true and a new trajectory in Israeli peace 
activism can be identified. Although the “big wheel” did slow down, this essay will show that 
the “small wheel”—the radical component—continued to move and develop new ideas, 
indicating that not all components of Israeli peace activism became paralyzed.  
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While it is true that the “big wheel” de-mobilized and moderated their message in 
order not to antagonize the Israeli public, who were the victims of Palestinian suicide bombs 
and rockets, thus paralyzing their ability to confront the status quo, the radical groups further 
radicalized their response by showing concern for the Palestinians under occupation, enabling 
them to continue to mobilize, leading to a clear polarization in Israeli peace activism rather 
than complete paralysis. This polarization can be identified in the immediate wake of the 
outbreak of the second Intifada, with the moderate and radical components taking opposing 
perspectives on the situation. Polarization deepened throughout the 2000s, as the moderate 
component moved towards the center of the Israeli political spectrum in order to stay in line 
with mainstream public opinion. The was particularly prominent in the case of Shalom 
Achshav, and exemplified by the appointment of Director Yariv Oppenheimer at the 
beginning of the second Intifada, who continued to conduct his military reserve duty in the 
West Bank, which he argues to be his “civilian duty.”11 The radical component, in contrast, 
has further radicalized since the outbreak of the second Intifada. This was particularly evident 
amongst women’s peace groups, as demonstrated by the emergence of the Koalitziat Nashim 
l’Shalom (Coalition of Women for Peace), which evolved from pre-existing female activists, 
such as the prominent group Nashim b’Schachor (Women in Black), but has taken a more 
explicitly critical approach towards the Israeli government and IDF, stating their “opposition 
to the militarism that permeates both [Israeli and Palestinian] societies.”12 In doing so, the 
more radical groups have challenged mainstream public opinion by holding to account the 
Israeli authorities in perpetuating the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in particular through the 
continued occupation of the Palestinians.   
The differences between the components of Israeli peace activism are most clearly 
seen through an analysis of the relationship between universal human rights and the 
particularistic principles inherent in Zionism in each the components’ positions. The 
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moderate component shifted to focus almost solely on particularistic concerns, such as the 
safety, security and continuity of Israel as the Jewish State, removing any pro-Palestinian 
sentiments from their messaging. Meanwhile, the radical component focused even more 
directly on universalism by emphasizing the negative impact of the Israeli occupation on the 
lives of the Palestinians, which has presented an opportunity to challenge the very 
foundations of a political peace process by refuting the idea that the Israelis and Palestinians 
are engaged in a symmetrical conflict. Accordingly the radical groups should be considered 
“anti-occupation” rather than “pro-peace,” which enables them to develop new motivations 
for acting. The alternative component of Israeli peace activism consists of those groups that 
are either trying to balance their focus between both the Israeli and Palestinian narratives and 
concerns or are focusing on revealing violations of Palestinian human rights perpetrated by 
Israelis, such as the Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions, which document the 
demolition of Palestinian homes by the Israeli army. Many of these groups emerged during 
the first Intifada of 1987-1991, and show an attempt to balance the two poles created by the 
moderate and radical components, either by not prioritizing the claims of one side of the 
conflict over the other or, by avoiding political discussions and focusing on the realities on 
the ground. In doing so these groups are also finding new ways to confront the occupation. 
Although polarization characterizes the period of Israeli peace activism since the 
Second Intifada, protests were held in the East Jerusalem neighborhood of Sheikh Jarrah 
between 2009 and 2012, which brought together Israeli activists from across the spectrum. 
Activism in Sheikh Jarrah was initiated by a group of radical left-wing Israeli students, with 
the aim of supporting Palestinian families who were being evicted from their homes in Sheikh 
Jarrah. According to one of the activists, they stayed with the Palestinians in their homes as 
“an act of solidarity with the families, which cannot really stop evictions but, can delay them 
a little bit.”13 Some of these activists had been involved in Ta’ayush (Partnership), one of the 
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first groups to emerge in the second Intifada and a key actor in developing the framing of the 
radical component, whose activities were built on the basis of “non-violent actions of 
solidarity to end the Israeli occupation.”14 
Some older activists, who interesting had also been involved in Ta’ayush activities in 
the early 2000s, became aware of the activism in Sheikh Jarrah and saw the opportunity to 
expand the framing of the evictions beyond that of “solidarity” to one of “injustice in the 
name of Israeli law.”15 The Palestinian residents were being evicted from their homes, to be 
immediately replaced by Jewish settlers, who claimed ownership of the properties, on the 
basis of a particular interpretation of an Ottoman Law. Following Israeli annexation of East 
Jerusalem in 1967, the law enabled Jews who had lost property in East Jerusalem in the 1948 
war to be able to reclaim it. However, Palestinian property that was abandoned in the 1948 
war could not be reclaimed and became state property.
16
 By framing the story of Sheikh 
Jarrah in a clear, accessible manner that focused on inequality between Israelis and 
Palestinians in the face of Israeli law, the activists believed it would draw media attention and 
encourage the involvement of people who were otherwise unlikely to engage with the radical 
fringes of peace activism.
17
 The protests succeeded in drawing attention to the plight of the 
Palestinians in East Jerusalem and temporarily halted the evictions. 
The careful, moderate framing of what was initially a radical act of solidarity with 
Palestinian families led to the mobilization of individuals from across the spectrum of Israeli 
peace activism, demonstrating how strategic framing can assist in enabling the components of 
Israeli peace activism to mobilize together. In addition, this illuminates the under-explored 
role of the radical component as the “early risers” who, in reframing approaches to conflict 
and peacebuilding through “solidarity” and “co-resistance” with the Palestinians under Israeli 
occupation, paradoxically widen the ideological gulf with the moderates and create the 
potential for future cooperation among all of the components.
18
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This essay explores this seeming paradox and, in doing so, offers a more nuanced 
treatment of Israeli peacemaking.  Its analysis centers upon the framing processes that have 
made the radical component an effective agent of change and traces the collective action 
frames of the three components in the immediate wake of the second Intifada into the 2010s.  
Re-centering the recent history of Israeli peace activism from previous scholars’ emphasis on 
the ability for peace activists to influence the political peace process to the ways in which 
various activists frame “conflict” and “peace” illuminates the specific challenges to new 
formations of Israeli peace activism, as well as these movements’ potential contributions to 
changing the social norms surrounding the Israeli perspectives over the causes of and issues 
within the Israeli-Palestinians conflict, and thus the potential for future solutions.
19
  
METHODOLOGY 
The method of data collection was based on qualitative methods, in line with other 
studies conducted on Israeli peace activism.
20
 The study of Israeli peace activism is in many 
respects the study of narratives of those individuals and groups involved in activism. 
Qualitative research methods allow for an appreciation of the individual’s understandings, 
experiences and interactions, rather than testing the correlations between previously defined 
variables.
21
 This research was therefore conducted as a semi-ethnographic study. Fieldwork 
was conducted in Israel between January 2013 and July 2013 to collect interviews from a 
variety of activists, core leadership, administrative personnel, and broader members.
22
 I also 
attended events and tours during my fieldwork in order to conduct some participant 
observation and gain first-hand experience. I attended a range of activities, across the 
different components of Israeli peace activism, in order to gain a broad picture. These 
included tours in the West Bank and Jerusalem run by activist groups, demonstrations in 
Israeli towns, solidarity actions in the West Bank, discussion groups amongst activists, 
humanitarian envoys to Palestinian villages and peace education workshops between Israelis 
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and Palestinians. Primary sources were also gathered through the websites of the 
organizations, calls for action via emails, as well as blogs written by activists. Secondary data 
was gathered mainly from newspaper articles and alternative media sites. Other studies on 
individual groups and autobiographical accounts were also consulted.  
The data has been analyzed through the method of traditional qualitative analysis with 
the goal of identifying the underlying collective action frames and framing processes that 
highlight and account for the ideas, beliefs, problem identification and solutions of the groups 
being studied. Whilst Israeli peace activism may not constitute a social movement, few 
phenomena will meet the strict, detailed definition of a social movement yet, elements of 
social movement theory have been widely applied to a number of cases of activism that fall 
short of fully-fledged movements.
23
 Looking at collective action frames is a way of delving 
into the internal features of a social movement to understand how the activists view the 
prevailing realities. Disaggregating and highlighting the meaning work of a social movement 
is important because, “whatever else social movement actors do, they seek to affect 
interpretations of reality among various audiences. They engage in this framing work because 
they assume, rightly or wrongly, that meaning is prefatory to action.”24 
The concept of “frames” was first identified by Goffman and was later followed by 
Gamson, Fireman & Rytina’s concept of “injustice frames,” which can be identified in the 
case of Israeli peace activism.
25
 Some theorists have focused on the collective and 
organizational processes of framing, 
 
which helps to understand a movement as a whole or 
the interactions between components and individual organizations.
 26
 This requires attention 
to be given to how certain organizations or components have chosen to collectively frame 
themselves in response to certain situations. In addition, Johnston & Klandermans identify 
that the ‘true location” of a frame is in the mind of an activist and therefore close attention 
has also been given to interviews conducted with activists.
27
 In analyzing the framing 
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processes this paper will provide a detailed study of the meaning work that Israeli activists 
are engaged in, providing a different angle from which to understand the trajectory of Israeli 
peace activism.  
Although the focus of this study is on the collective action frames of Israeli peace 
activism, the context in which these frames developed must be outlined in order to provide a 
full understanding. In social movement theory the exogenous factors are known as “political 
opportunity structures” and refer to the factors in the external environment that facilitate or 
constrain activism, such as the nature of the government, security discourse, and cultural 
norms.
28
 However, political opportunity structures are only opportunities or threats if they are 
perceived as such; they should not be treated as “objective,” but viewed instead from the 
perspective of the social movement actors.
29
 According to Doug McAdam, John McCarthy 
and Mayer Zald, the fate of a social movement is “heavily shaped by their own actions.”30 
This highlights the important role of agency in social movement theory and therefore the 
centrality of the meaning work being done not only in response to the prevailing realities but 
also despite them. Therefore, some context will be given to shed light on the shifting 
collective action frames. 
The choice to set the demarcation point of this study at the start of the second Intifada 
in late 2000 is also a deliberate one. Given this analysis is focused on the internal dynamics, 
it is suitable to provide a demarcation point that represents a turning point in the internal 
dynamics of Israeli peace activism. Just as 1978 represented an internal shift in Israeli peace 
activism, with the consolidation of disparate peace attempts into something that resembled a 
movement, in 2000 another internal shift occurred in Israeli peace activism with the 
polarization of the components and significant shifts in framing processes and collective 
action frames. 
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Some clarification over the use of certain terms is necessary at this stage. Hermann 
explains that the term “Israeli peace movement” is an “analytical construct rather than a 
concrete entity,” noting that the “movement” was always comprised of various individual 
organizations and groups that held different underlying beliefs and ideas about the conflict.
31
 
She bases her use of the term “peace movement” upon the fact that many groups saw 
themselves as one body that was opposed to the national camp and that many outsiders also 
saw distinct peace organizations as one movement.
32
 I have chosen, however, to use the term 
“Israeli peace activism” as the overarching analytical unit of this study. This is for two main 
reasons. First, it helps in distinguishing the periods in which the groups were more or less 
fragmented; I use the term “peace movement” in the period when there was an organization 
that was capable of rallying together hundreds of thousands of participants and when the 
other groups would join them for mass demonstrations. I use the term “Israeli peace 
activism” at times when there was more fragmentation, such as in the first decades of the 
State and the period post-2000. Secondly, the term “Israeli peace movement” has become a 
euphemism for the liberal Zionist camp and therefore does not encapsulate the full range of 
groups that are operating.  
Complexities also arise in describing the activists as Israeli “peace” activists, since 
some within the radical and alternative components reject the label “peace” activists. They 
explain that the term “peace” is associated with the political peace process and the goals of 
the moderate component, which they seek to distance themselves from.
33
 The nature and 
framing of their activism, as challenging the realities on the ground, suggests that the term 
“anti-occupation” activists would be more accurate to describe them. However, in order to 
maintain analytic simplicity and a comparative element with previous studies, the term Israeli 
“peace” activism will continue to be used.  
POLARIZATION IN THE WAKE OF THE SECOND INTIFADA 
13 
 
13 
 
Despite the brief alignment of the moderate and radical components of Israeli peace 
activism in supporting Ehud Barak at Camp David II, the failure of the summit sparked a 
progressive polarization between the moderate and radical components, with the two taking 
opposing positions in response to Barak’s post-summit rhetoric that there was “no partner for 
peace on the Palestinian side.”34 Shalom Achshav and the moderate component maintained a 
similar prognostic framing from the previous phase,
 
particularly the strategy of not 
positioning themselves too far in front on public opinion with respect to the conflict, in order 
not to “lose the public.”35 In the face of low levels of support for the Oslo process among the 
Israeli Jewish public, the moderates strategically accepted Barak’s rhetoric and made a “very 
strong effort, a direct effort to change [their] image to be moderate” by ridding themselves of 
any pro-Palestinian sentiments.
36
 The wave of suicide bombings conducted by some 
Palestinians reinforced the need for this shift in the collective action frames of the moderate 
component as the Israeli public “lost faith” in the peace process. Furthermore, many within 
the movement, including some of the leadership felt betrayed by the Palestinians, even if their 
contacts were not the ones perpetrating the violence, and wanted to “change the image” of 
Shalom Achshav to be “more conservative.”37 In line with their traditional strategy, Shalom 
Achshav has continued with a pragmatic as opposed to a principled approach, which meant a 
reduction in calls for large scale protests and a shift in their diagnostic framing to an even 
more focused attention on the settlements as the main obstacle to peace.
38
 The strategy of 
Shalom Achshav is summed up by Hagit Ofran, the Director of their Settlement Watch 
Project, “We try to influence public opinion. Influencing public opinion requires that we 
relate to the political agenda so our message resonates within public discourse...[we] attempt 
to speak the language mainstream Israelis might be able to listen to – or at least the media 
that nourishes what the mainstream can accept.”39  
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In stark contrast, the radical left refused to accept Barak’s rhetoric and shifted its 
prognostic framing, which involved giving up promoting a political solution and further 
radicalizing as the Intifada progressed. According to peace activist Irit Halperin, “[t] he 
second Intifada showed that the peace camp had to use a much more radical perspective that 
would be able to confront the mainstream belief [that the Palestinians continually rejected 
peace offers from Israel and therefore did not want peace] about the reasons for the conflict 
and the ways to resolve it. Resisting the mainstream ideology gave these groups the 
capability to confront the traditional meaning of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.”40 This 
radicalization can be identified in the shifts in the way in which the radical component 
framed the conflict, its origins, and viable solutions. New groups, most notably Ta’ayush, and 
Anarchistim Neged Ha’Gader in the radical component and Shovrim Shtika (Breaking the 
Silence) and Machsom Watch in the alternative component, emerged finding new ways to 
challenge Israeli leaders’ approaches to and framing of the conflict. Their ability to continue 
to operate as activity within the moderate component slowed, can be explained through the 
framing processes they underwent and how they perceived the political opportunity 
structures.  
POLARIZATION DEEPENED: UNIVERSALISM VS PARTICULARISM 
Continuous shifts in the context in which the activists were operating and their 
perceptions of these, namely the continuation and heightening of the second Intifada and the 
Israeli response to it, the erection of the Separation Barrier, the Hamas take-over of Gaza, and 
the Israeli operations in Gaza that followed, led to the deepening of the polarization between 
the moderate component and the radical component, with the alternative component 
presenting collective action frames that in some ways showed signs of balancing the two 
poles.
41
 The differing trajectories of moderate and radical components can be most clearly 
determined and understood through an analysis of the extent to which activists within each 
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component emphasize universal or particularistic principles in framing issues of conflict and 
peacebuilding. Whilst all components are acting with the aim to end the occupation, there is a 
difference in the motivations behind this; whether removing the occupation is an end in itself, 
as the radical component would argue, or a means to an end, as the moderate component has 
always proposed. A tension had always been present in the Zionist movement between 
universal principles of humanity and the particularism of Zionism and this tension was 
historically reflected in the Israeli peace movement, with Shalom Achshav in particular 
struggling to reconcile the two.
42
 This can be seen in their reports on the settlements. In the 
details of their reports there is often reference to the human rights impact of the settlements 
on the Palestinians yet, their central framing of the problem of the settlements stresses the 
particularism of Zionism, whereby “settlements… represent an existential threat to Israel as a 
Jewish, democratic state.”43 Similarly, the external framing in its peak years in the 1980s 
prioritized the importance of peace for the sake of the security of Israel whilst internally, 
members were often involved in activities, such as demonstrations, sit-ins and dialogue 
activities, in the West Bank that were aimed at reducing harm experienced by the 
Palestinians. Since the second Intifada, Shalom Achshav has shifted towards an even more 
particularistic approach, focusing on the future of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, in 
its attempt to stay relevant to mainstream public opinion.  
The radical left, while also concerned with the settlements, diverges from the 
moderate component in that the groups are exclusively centered on universal principles, 
which emerges as a focus on the suffering of the Palestinians under occupation. Ta’ayush 
developed the following collective action frame in the wake of the second Intifada, with a 
central message that emphasizes rights for all, “Together we strive for a future of 
equality, justice and peace through concrete, daily, non-violent actions of solidarity to end the 
Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories and to achieve full civil equality for all.”44 
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Their activity reports consistently focus on the negative impact of the settlements, settlers and 
Israeli army presence on the daily lives of the Palestinians.
45
 Having rejected the state 
narrative that prioritizes Israeli security above all, the radicals are able to present innovative 
and confrontational collective action frames. The alternative component seems to be 
attempting to balance the two poles, with the groups situating themselves across a spectrum 
that sits in between the collective action frames of the radical and moderate groups.  
The shifts in collective action frames have also led to a shift in the tactics that are 
employed by the different organizations and groups. This is a further means of demarcating 
the components, with more radical collective actions frames allowing for more 
confrontational tactics. This is seen in weekly demonstrations against the Separation Barrier, 
in Palestinian villages such as Bi’ilin and Nabi Saleh, where members of the more radical 
groups, in particular Anarchistim Neged HaGader, demonstrate in direct opposition to the 
Israeli army, alongside Palestinian activists. These demonstrations often turn violent, with 
Palestinians throwing rocks and the Israeli army shooting tear gas or rubber-coated bullets at 
the activists. In contrast, as will be further explained below, Lochamim l’Shalom (Combatants 
for Peace), a central group in the alternative component, make every attempt to avoid these 
violent confrontations, despite also conducting demonstrations against the Israeli army and in 
solidarity with the Palestinians.  
The Moderate Component: Sticking with Consensus 
Shalom Achshav has continued its efforts to rid itself of pro-Palestinian sentiments 
since the second Intifada. They sought advice from public relations (PR) companies on how 
to attract the Israeli public and, along with a new member of Shalom Achshav who worked in 
PR, advised the organization on how they could come across “more Israeli.”46 One pertinent 
example of how they promoted this new image was the creation of a new flag. The original 
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flag has the words “Shalom Achshav” written in Hebrew letters in black and red on a white 
background. The new flag has the word “Shalom” written in Hebrew letters in blue inside 
two horizontal blue lines on a white background, which closely mirrors the Israeli flag, thus 
demonstrating the patriotism of the organization.
47
 The moderate peace movement continues 
to be informed by a liberal Zionist ideology, which is outlined by Yossi Beilin, the initiator of 
the 1993 Oslo Agreements and of the 2003 Geneva Initiative, “[w]e [the Zionist left] have a 
deep belief in the right of the Jewish people to a democratic and secure state, which has a 
stable Jewish majority: the state of the Jewish people and all of its citizens. We are convinced 
our national interest is in completing the moves towards peace with the Palestinians, Syria 
and Lebanon, and that there is no alternative to an agreement.”48  
A number of framing processes can be identified in the moderate component’s attempt 
to stay relevant to their primary target audience: the Israeli public. Frame extension, the 
process of adding other issues to the primary concern of the social movement organization, 
can be seen in Shalom Achshav’s criticism of the West Bank settlements as the “main 
obstacle for peace.”49 Their Settlement Watch Project has become the central raison d’être 
of Shalom Achshav, and arguably the only effective strategy it currently has in promoting a 
two-state solution.
50
  They track settlement building and use any expansions to argue that the 
facts on the ground show that possibility of a two-state solution is in jeopardy. Most of the 
Israeli public still believes in a two-state solution; however, they are skeptical about the 
likelihood or possibility of implementation.
51
 The Settlement Watch Project gives Shalom 
Achshav a tool with which to pressure the Israeli public to act on its belief in a two-state 
solution. 
However, the aftermath of the 2005 unilateral disengagement of Israel from Gaza 
(which Shalom Achshav supported) and the rise of Hamas has meant that the doctrine of 
“land for peace,” on which the criticism of settlements is based, no longer holds resonance 
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amongst the Israeli public. The concept that peace would bring security was destabilized as, 
arguably, the peace process only led to increased personal insecurity for Israeli citizens. In 
recognition of this, the moderate peace movement tried to re-sell the two-state solution 
through frame transformation, the process of shifting old understandings and beliefs 
regarding an area of contention or creating new ideas, and frame amplification, the process of 
“embellishing, clarifying or invigorating” existing understandings and beliefs, that argues for 
its necessity as “the only solution that will ensure the future of Israel as Jewish and 
democratic.”52 According to Yariv Oppenheimer, the former Director General of Shalom 
Achshav, “if Israel will continue to control the West Bank, we [Israel] are going to lose our 
identity either as a Jewish State or as a democratic state.”53 A sense of urgency is added to the 
framing given by Shalom Achshav, with the claim that “the window of opportunity” for a 
two-state solution is coming to an end.
54
 However, despite these attempts to shake the Israeli 
public into mobilizing behind the two-state solution through re-framing their message, there 
was little response in support of Shalom Achshav. This can be explained in part due to a 
growing dislike for Shalom Achshav, with a poll conducted in August 2009 finding that 41 
percent of respondents felt that Shalom Achshav had caused damage to Israel, and partly due 
to the shifts in the Israeli political climate and Israeli public opinion.
55
 
Israeli public opinion has shifted towards the political center and right, with the issue of 
security remaining a prominent concern. This has meant that the moderate component no 
longer has the support of hundreds and thousands to take to the streets to demand peace. 
Furthermore, the political parties which the moderate peace movement has traditionally been 
closest to, Meretz and Avoda, have seen declining support. Combined they held 15.9 percent 
of the votes in the 2013 elections compared with 34.2 percent of votes in the 1996 elections, 
whereas there has been a rise in right-wing parties. Having few allies within the Government 
to lobby, combined with the unwillingness of the moderate peace movement to overly 
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challenge the Israeli public with regards to ending the occupation and the arguably successful 
diffusion of the concept of a two-state solution into Israeli public opinion, has meant that the 
moderate peace component has, as concluded by Hermann, become “politically irrelevant.”56 
Galia Golan, a former leader and spokesperson for Shalom Achshav, expressed her 
disappointment that the organization did not follow the direction of some of the alternative 
and radical components. In speaking about Lochamim l’Shalom, she expressed her affiliation 
with them, “I feel 100% at home with them and they are doing what I feel Shalom Achshav 
should be doing - what we used to do. The trips to the territories, the dialogues with the 
Palestinians, joint activities with the Palestinians. We did all these things, running round in Silwan [a 
Palestinian neighborhood in East Jerusalem], we were the ones running around on the rooftops in 
Silwan saying “don’t do this.”
57
 However, the decision to moderate their framing has meant Shalom 
Achshav has been unable to be as confrontational as she would have liked. 
The Radical Component: Challenging Consensus 
Since the radical groups are not focused on mobilizing the Israeli public nor do they 
perceive an opportunity to influence the Israeli government, they do not need to moderate 
their message to appeal to the mainstream and are therefore able to be more confrontational. 
In doing so have developed new ideas and understandings of the conflict. Some are critical of 
the moderate component for accepting the basic concepts behind a Jewish state, which entails 
some non-universalistic characteristics and choose instead to focus solely on the negative 
impacts of the Israeli military occupation on the lives of the Palestinians, such as restrictions 
of movement, collective punishment and house demolitions.
58
 They criticize Shalom Achshav 
in particular for failing to acknowledge the Palestinian historical narrative as an oppressed 
people and for not “confront[ing] history from the standpoint of the oppressed.”59 According 
to Gush Shalom, the role of Israeli peace activism following the collapse of Camp David was 
to “lead public opinion to a brave reassessment of the national “narrative” and rid it of false 
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myths.”60 This has manifested through a number of framing processes, which present 
examples of norm entrepreneurship in practice. 
“Harm reduction,” for instance, became a central tenet of the radical left, with activities 
involving “going to places where the occupation and expulsion actually take place,” with the 
explicit aim to “confront racism and discrimination where they happen.”61 This is reflective 
of some of the radical groups and often members of Shalom Achshav in the previous phase, 
which began demonstrating in places where the Israeli army or Israeli settlers were harming 
or violating the rights of the Palestinians, such as at checkpoints, during the olive harvest, or 
through house demolitions. However, in this current phase, such solidarity actions define the 
identity of the activist groups and are not merely a part of their tactical repertoires, 
representing a process of frame transformation, with the terms “co-resistance” and 
“solidarity” replacing the concept of “co-existence” that characterized the movement’s aims, 
identity and tactics in previous phases.
62
 One of the first groups to emerge along these lines, 
and as a result of the events of the second Intifada, was Ta’ayush, which created the 
framework of joint Arab-Jewish humanitarian solidarity activism that underlay much of the 
collective action frames and tactical repertoires of the radical left in this phase.
63
 According 
to Kaminer, “Ta’ayush discovered something, that people in the radical left did not believe in 
any kind of political process so, instead of organizing a demonstration with 150 people by the 
Prime Minister’s office, they said, “let’s fill up a truck with goods and go to one of the areas 
and bring them stuff.”64  
The focus on the realities on the ground led the radical component and some groups 
within the alternative component to reject the term “peace,” citing it as an abstract concept 
and one only to be associated with Shalom Achshav and the Oslo Peace Accords, which they 
argued favored the Israeli side.
65
 Many groups within the radical left have shifted to referring 
to themselves as “anti-occupation, anti-apartheid, anti-wall,” activists as opposed to “peace” 
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activists, representing what one activist called the maturation of the peace movement, as 
opposed to its death.
66
 Some have also transformed their prognostic framing to center on 
“justice” and “equality,” which brings them closer to the global social justice movement. This 
can be seen in the mission statements of the radical groups, such as Ta’ayush and the 
Koalitziat Nadhim l’Shalom respectively: 
Together we strive for a future of equality, justice and peace through 
concrete, daily, non-violent actions of solidarity to end the Israeli occupation 
of the Palestinian territories and to achieve full civil equality for all.
67
   
The vision of peace is indivisible from the vision of justice and equality. We 
seek to install all three principles into all aspects of Israeli society.
68
  
One example of how the language of “justice” and “equality” has affected the prognostic 
framing of the radical groups is the emphasis on 1948 as the beginning of the Israeli 
occupation as opposed to since the aftermath of the 1967 war, which is the starting point for 
the moderate component. Zochrot (Remembering) is an Israeli organization that seeks to raise 
awareness of the Palestinian Nakba (Catastrophe) of 1948 in the Israeli Jewish consciousness 
and supports the right of return for Palestinian refugees, something that is almost taboo 
amongst Israeli society. According to one of the founders, the organization was built 
following a “provocative piece in Ha’aretz, which challenged the nationalist position.”69 The 
focus on historical narratives represents a frame transformation that can be linked to the work 
of New Historians such as Avi Shlaim and Ilan Pappe. In framing themselves in this way, 
they have been able to develop joint actions with Palestinians and Palestinian Citizens of 
Israel. This was seen in the demonstrations against the Gaza Operations, with a veteran 
activist Hannah Safran arguing that “something else has developed on the ruins of the old 
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Zionist left.”70 This identifies the importance of collective action frames in not only 
presenting new ideas but also in affecting the suitability of certain tactics and participants. 
Universal human rights can also be identified underlying the discourse of “haves” and 
“have-nots” that is particularly prevalent in the young generation of activists. A process of 
frame-bridging can be identified in the connections that are made between the oppression 
inherent in the occupation with oppression in other areas of Israeli society, such as the lower 
socioeconomic sector of the Mizrahi community, women, refugees and migrant workers.
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These groups seek to combat all forms of oppression whilst being constantly aware of their 
privilege as mainly Ashkenazi educated Jews and the need to empower the oppressed peoples 
to form their own struggles.
 72
 This is also an example of frame extension, whereby the 
identified struggle has extended beyond that of peace or ending the occupation to one of 
combatting all forms of oppression, which are seen as intertwined with each other. Tarabut-
Hithabrut (Come Together/Associate) was formed out of members of Ta’ayush with these 
principles in mind. They argued that whilst the goals and work of Ta’ayush were extremely 
important and had managed to shift the discourse among the radical left, something with a 
wider participant base that could form into a political movement was needed. One activist 
described how a movement made up of “Jews that were usually extremely privileged, mostly 
white Ashkenazi and mostly intellectual, cannot be a proper grassroots movement for long 
term political change.”73 Tarabut-Hithabrut is a front of the Hadash political party and seeks 
to empower those from oppressed communities to “free themselves” and identify not as 
victims of different social ills, but as activists struggling against their shared oppression.
74
 
This frame extension has had the effect of shifting the identity of activists within the Israeli 
left, with the division between those who are represented within the movement and those who 
are not, more closely associated with class division than the ethnic divisions of the previous 
phases.
75
 While the peace activists remain predominantly Ashkenazi, middle-class Jews, there 
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is a greater awareness of the need to expand the membership to marginalized groups. There is 
greater potential for this due to the identified shifts in the collective action frames that make 
Israeli peace activism more inclusive to other activists.  
The radicalization in the collective action frames also enabled the employment of 
more confrontational tactics. Since the radical component was not concerned with influencing 
the Israeli public and not constrained by the state narrative, they were able to use more 
radical tactics. The most prominent example is that of Anarchistim Neged HaGader. Regular 
demonstrations in the form of nonviolent resistance against the Separation Barrier were 
incorporated in the tactics of Israeli peace activism in 2003 following a four-month protest 
camp formed by Palestinian, Israeli, and international activists in the Palestinian village of 
Mas’ha, whose land was being cut off due to the erection of the Separation Barrier. Each 
week Israeli activists travel to the West Bank to join Palestinians in resisting the Separation 
Barrier, which has spread to different Palestinian villages, most notably Bil’in, Nabi Saleh 
and Al Ma’asara.76 These demonstrations involve directly confronting the IDF, which is not 
widely accepted in Israeli society, due to the high regard given to the army, which is based on 
compulsory conscription. The actions against the IDF therefore further separate the radical 
component from the moderate component. The collective action frames of the radical 
component since the second Intifada has led to their further marginalization in Israeli society 
and the moderate component has been quick to disassociate themselves from the radical left, 
although they too are considered a marginal sector of society. 
The Alternative Component: Trying to Reconcile Differences 
Groups within the alternative component seem to be responding to the increasing 
polarization in two ways: first, by attempting to balance or reconcile universalism and 
particularistic values in their framing and activities; and second by shifting their attention to 
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revealing hidden realities. While this may have provided an alternative entry point for new 
activists, it also signifies further the fragmentation of Israeli peace activism. 
A joint Israeli-Palestinian group emerged toward the end of the second Intifada that 
can be seen as representing a balance between the frames of the moderate and radical 
components. Lochamim l’Shalom was formed by a group of ex-combatants from both sides. 
It was conceived of by an Israeli, Yonatan Shapira, who in October 2003 initiated a group of 
Israeli Air Force Pilots to refuse missions over the Palestinian Territories. Those involved 
felt, however, that the debate needed to extend beyond the Israeli side and to reach those 
Palestinians who had been involved in violence and were now opposed to it and, following a 
series of secret discussions, Lochamim l’Shalom was born.77 In what can be described as a 
series of attempts to balance Universalist humanism with Zionism, Lochamim l’Shalom has 
succeeded in attracting significant numbers of new members.
78
 In particular, they conduct 
solidarity and resistance activities to condemn the suffering of the Palestinians but remain 
clear in their goal of a two-state solution that allows Israeli participants to maintain a Zionist 
outlook, as confirmed by the bi-national identity of the group, as opposed to a Palestinian 
solidarity group. They conduct dialogue activities in order for the two sides to get to know 
each other but are clear that they are not a “dialogue” group based on the contact 
hypothesis.
79
 The group is also open to non-combatants, given their belief that in “militarized 
societies such as ours [Israeli and Palestinian] everyone was in one way or another involved 
in the violence” and that in order to bring change “[they] needed everybody.”80  
While there are some clear similarities with groups in the radical component, in 
particular the solidarity actions in the West Bank, Lochamin l’Shalom attempts to distance 
themselves from the radical component, and keeping in line with their framing, have 
developed creative methods in their tactics to emphasize the nonviolent nature of their 
protest. Unlike the radical groups, such as Anarchistim Neged HaGader, Lochamin L’Shalom 
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does not want to provoke violence nor confront the IDF in an overt manner. One activist says 
of its activities, “We avoid violence because the army can be very violent; they are just kids 
and they are terrified…we play football in front of the army, we have flown kites…we try to 
come with something original.”81  The combination of these collective action frames with less 
confrontational tactics has shown signs of success in terms of mobilizing the Israeli public. 
Around 2,500 people attended their joint Israeli-Palestinian Memorial Day Ceremony in 
2013.
82
  
The second way in which the alternative component is arguably striking a balance 
between the moderate and radical components is by focusing on revealing the hidden realities 
of occupation. Whilst the radical component has framed itself in a way that ignores the Israeli 
public and the moderate component avoids developing frames that are too confrontational for 
the Israeli public, groups in the alternative component are challenging the Israeli public by 
reporting on human rights violations. A number of groups, such as B’tselem  and ACRI (The 
Association for Civil Rights in Israel) were involved in these activities in the previous phase 
of Israeli peace activism, particularly since the first Intifada. However, given the shifting 
political context, particularly the humanitarian situation in Gaza, more groups have emerged 
with the aim of bringing the Israeli public out of its apathy, ignorance or denial.
83
 These 
groups provide reports on the civil and human rights situations in Israel, the West Bank and 
Gaza. In doing so, they raise awareness of the harm caused to the Palestinians by the Israeli 
occupation, showing similarities with the radical component, without criticizing the liberal 
Zionist ideology of the moderate component. In doing this, the alternative component 
presents a less confrontational collective action frame than the radical component, yet 
continues to put forward ideas that challenge public consensus.  
The human rights groups are keen to differentiate themselves from the political groups 
(both radical and moderate) by eschewing an emphasis on solidarity in favor of taking a 
26 
 
26 
 
rights-based approach by working on cases or issues that could meet the criteria for a human 
rights violation set by the international community. However, there is an understanding 
amongst the activists that the Israeli public may not be open to the language of human rights. 
Hagai El-Ad from ACRI noted that these organizations “need to think about how to make 
human rights relevant to people that are less secular, less liberal and have a different set of 
values than the liberal, secular set of values.”84 This affects the way in which the leadership 
of groups within the alternative component present their mission and activities; or, in other 
words, the way in which they construct their collective action frames. According to Tania 
Hary of the human rights organization, Gisha (Legal Centre for Freedom of Movement), 
We define ourselves in the community of human rights organizations…we 
do not see ourselves as a peace organization or a political organization per 
se because we are working within the framework of human rights and 
International Law. It is important for us to do that and maintain that 
professionalism in order to make the message heard. Of course we are 
identified with the left but…we are trying to say that respect for human 
rights should not be an issue that is reserved for the left or leftist discourse.
85
  
A number of other Israeli NGOs outside the human rights community, have also emerged 
with similar missions to dispel the ignorance of many Israelis of the realities on the ground in 
the West Bank and Gaza, motivated by the belief that, “people need to know what is going on 
to make changes, to try and achieve something.”86 Ir Amim (City of People) and Emek 
Shaveh (Valley of Worth) focus their efforts on Jerusalem in order to “raise awareness about 
what is being done in Jerusalem, what the implications are, what the complexities are.”87 Ir 
Amim looks at the ramifications of the policies in Jerusalem in terms of politics, security and 
humanitarian issues, highlighting the complexities and the differences between Jewish 
neighborhoods and Palestinian neighborhoods. Emek Shaveh focuses on the role of 
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archaeology in political conflict, arguing that archaeology is political because the 
archaeologists get to decide what will be seen and what will not.
88
 The aim of the 
organization is to “explain the role of archaeology in the conflict and to understand how it has 
influenced life here,” since they believe that “Israelis are not aware that archaeology is a 
political tool at all.”89  
Shovrim Shtika is a unique organization that centers its work upon the testimonies of 
Israeli soldiers who have served in the West Bank and Gaza, starting with those who were 
active in the second Intifada. They aim to, “make heard the voices of these soldiers, pushing 
Israel to face the reality whose creation it has enabled.”90 In highlighting this disconnect 
between the experiences of soldiers and life as a civilian, the organization also frames itself 
as a safe space for soldiers to verbalize what they have been through, rather than keeping it to 
themselves, as is expected of them. In this sense they create the space for soldiers to “break 
the silence,” which in turn breaks some of the illusions that much of the Israeli public held to, 
and perhaps even identified themselves by.  
Despite their careful attempts to balance universal and particularistic values, the 
groups within the alternative component have not succeeded in engaging the Israeli public. In 
order to maintain momentum and ensure an audience, the international community has 
become increasingly important target for Israeli peace activism, both in terms of attracting 
resources and ideological support. 
TOWARDS THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
For those in the radical component who have given up on mobilizing the Israeli 
public, and those from the alternative component who wish to expand their audience, the 
international community has become a central dimension to attract. For the radical 
component, there is a connection with transnational social movements that are also focused 
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on the Palestinian struggle, such as The International Solidarity Movement and the Boycott, 
Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) Movement. Anarchistim Neged HaGader activists in 
particular feel connected to these movements and believe that they “are more an extension of 
the international movement in Israel than an extension of the Israeli movement.”91 While 
connecting with these movements may provide material capacity in the form of funding and 
may give the activists momentum in the face of an unresponsive domestic scene, they only 
serve to further decrease the legitimacy of the radical groups within Israel, particularly since 
the passing of the Anti-Boycott Law in 2011 that “prohibits the public promotion of boycott 
by Israeli citizens and organizations against Israeli institutions or illegal Israeli settlements in 
the West Bank [and] it enables the filing of civil lawsuits against anyone who calls for 
boycott.”92  
The groups in the alternative component seek to influence public opinion and decision 
makers in other countries by disseminating their reports in English. The human rights groups 
were particularly active in response to the developing humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip, 
due to restrictions of goods to and from the area and the military operations conducted by 
Israel that killed thousands of Palestinian civilians. In November 2006, eight organizations 
issued a joint statement on the “Gaza humanitarian Crisis,” and following each of the three 
major operations in 2008/9, 2012, and 2014 they produced reports of Israel’s use of force in 
the Gaza strip.
93 
These reports sought to encourage the international community to play a role 
in ensuring that “Israel respect the basic human rights of residents of the Gaza Strip, and that 
all parties respect International humanitarian law.”94 With the Israeli public and government 
are unwilling to listen or accept the content of these reports, 
 
the international community 
became the primary target. This suggests a situation reflective of Keck and Sikkink’s 
boomerang process, whereby when domestic actors cannot influence their own public or 
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government, they appeal to international actors to lobby their own governments to put 
pressure on Israel.
95
  
The groups also conduct “alternative” tours to the West Bank for foreigners visiting Israel. 
Similar tours had been conducted prior to the second Intifada by peace activists, but in this 
phase the tours were specifically aimed at revealing hidden narratives and raising awareness 
of Palestinian suffering as part of the alternative faction’s goal to remove the Israeli “state of 
denial.” The Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions explains the aim of their tours as 
an attempt provide participants with “an overview of some of the main issues facing a 
population living under occupation; house demolitions, displacement, education, refugees, 
water, lack of freedom of movement, women's issues and discrimination within the state of 
Israel.”96 Although these groups are not acting alongside “anti-Israel” or “pro-Palestinian” 
groups, their attempts to speak to the international community only reinforce their 
marginality at home.  
RETURNING TO THE ISRAELI PUBLIC: INJUSTICE FRAMING PROVES 
SUCCESSFUL 
Despite the polarization and fragmentation of Israeli peace activism in the period 
since the second Intifada, alongside the difficulties the moderate component had in 
mobilizing the Israeli public, the story of Sheikh Jarrah shows the continued relevance of 
Israeli peace activism. In particular it confirms the argument that the radical component are 
norm entrepreneurs and shows that they have the potential to mobilize activists beyond the 
radical fringes.  
The initial identification of the injustice towards the Palestinian residents, the 
solidarity actions conducted by the radical students and the strategic framing that followed 
led to the mobilization of the largest solidarity group that the radical left has managed to 
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gather from across the political spectrum, with an estimated five thousand people protesting 
in Sheikh Jarrah in March 2010.
97
 While the initial involvement of activists was borne out of 
the radical left framing of Palestinian solidarity, it was because of the “clear-cut story of 
inequality in the face of the law,” as well as the unthreatening location of the protests, a 
fifteen- minute walk from the center of Jewish West Jerusalem and along the bus route to the 
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, in a “fairly safe middle-class Palestinian neighborhood” that 
brought out members of the moderate component, temporarily bridging the chasm that had 
become entrenched between the moderate and radical left.
98
 This episode in Israeli peace 
activism provides an example of successful framing originating from the radical component, 
which was based on an injustice frame that is centered on human rights, without directly 
challenging a Zionist ideology or state narrative.  
The swell of Israeli peace activism in Sheikh Jarrah did not last more than a few 
years, however, due to a number of reasons. With particular reference to the issue of framing, 
an ideological disagreement arose within the core group between those who wanted to use the 
opportunity to push their more radical agenda and those that felt that “purity of heart” would 
be at the cost of effectiveness in building a mass movement.
99
 “Purity of heart” refers to 
maintaining solidarity with the Palestinian families in Sheikh Jarrah in case of future eviction 
orders, whereas other argued that moving on to other cases of injustice was needed to help 
build a movement. This is connected to a common phenomenon, as explained by postmodern 
ideas on social and cultural fragmentation, particularly within left-wing movements, whereby 
critique and ideological commitment can cause fragmentation and are sometimes undertaken 
in contradiction with pragmatic developments.
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 Despite the inability to maintain the protests 
in Sheikh Jarrah nor transport the same intensity of demonstrations to other Palestinian 
neighborhoods also facing similar evictions, the case of Sheikh Jarrah highlights the 
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important role of the radical component and the possibility of reconciling the differences 
amongst the different components of Israeli peace activism.  
CONCLUSION: NORM ENTREPRENEUNERSHIP IN PRACTICE  
The challenge of developing a master frame that will accommodate all components 
and groups is, however, particularly difficult in this current phase of Israeli peace activism 
due to the polarization and fragmentation between the radical, moderate and alternative 
components, which is compounded by dissension within each component. The ways in which 
they frame themselves, the underlying problems and their proposed solutions are in stark 
contrast with one another, making any formal coordination or unification unlikely. However, 
despite the inability to present a unified front or to affect government policy, Israeli peace 
activism has undergone interesting and potentially important framing processes, which has 
created new collective action frames that have opened up new opportunities for mobilization 
and change.  
This is particularly true for the radical component which, through a process of 
radicalization, is reassessing the origins of the conflict and reframing ways in which to 
confront it. By focusing on universal values, such as justice and equality, they are shifting the 
meaning of “peace” and how it can be achieved. Although at present their activities are 
focused on alleviating the suffering of the Palestinians and ignoring the Israeli public, this 
process of norm entrepreneurship highlights the fact that not all components of Israeli peace 
activism were paralyzed in the wake of the second Intifada and points towards the “early 
riser” role that the radical component has traditionally played.  
Given the paralysis of the moderate component as it moved toward the center of the 
Israeli political spectrum, the alternative component could be arguably be starting to assume 
the “big wheel” function that moderate component once did in the “big wheel/small wheel” 
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dynamic. The “new moderate component” will continue to call for a two-state solution (or 
some variant of it) but will use collective action frames and tactical repertoires that are more 
confrontational, which were developed by the radical component in the period since the 
second Intifada in 2000. This can already be seen in the alternative component’s attempt to 
focus on revealing hidden realities, where they attempt to encourage the Israeli public to 
“wake-up” to the Palestinian predicament, without challenging the foundations of the Jewish 
State. This is evident in the annual joint Israeli and Palestinian Memorial Ceremony of 
Lochamim l’Shalom, which is held on the national Israeli Memorial Day and commemorates 
the losses on both sides, emphasizes the need to end the occupation, whilst calling for two 
states existing side by side in peace.
101
 This presents a more radical position than the 
moderate component, without focusing solely on the Palestinian experiences of the conflict. 
The effect of these shifting dynamics has meant that the moderate component has become 
redundant, but the alternative component and radical component have maintained their 
momentum. In an era marked by the growing marginalization of peace activists, an Israeli 
public that seems content with the status quo and a progressively more right wing 
government, the alternative and radical components present the new ideas and actions to 
challenge the status quo, confirming the argument that not all components of Israeli peace 
activism became paralyzed and should encourage the continual assessment of their role as 
norm entrepreneurs. 
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